Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20598 (U.S. Ct. of App. 3d. Cir., August 15, 2024) (Hardiman, J.)
OPINION OF THE COURT
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves an inmate seeking to recover damages from federal prison officials because of sexual assaults committed by another inmate. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 213 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2022), we hold that no federal constitutional claim lies to redress such injury. And even if it did, the complaint filed in this case was untimely. For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the suit.
…we join our sister courts and hold that the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program precludes a Bivens remedy. In doing so, we track the Supreme Court’s holding in Egbert that an agency’s grievance process is a special factor foreclosing Bivens relief. And we recognize the abrogation of Bistrian’s contrary holding that “[t]he administrative grievance process is not an alternative [remedy].”
Fisher cannot rely on our previous decisions that recognized a Bivens action for failure to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence. The Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert has abrogated those precedents. Applying Egbert, we hold that no constitutional claim lies against federal officials who fail to protect a prisoner from the violence of other inmates. So Fisher has no cause of action under Bivens.
…hold that Bivens and § 1983 actions operate under identical timeliness rules. As with § 1983, the residual or general personal injury statute of limitations applies to Bivens. Both causes of action are best served by this “uniform, easily applicable limitations period.
At least three of our sister courts have synthesized the Supreme Court’s teachings in Owens and Hardin as we do here. In constitutional tort cases, they borrow state tolling and revival rules that apply across the board to personal injury torts, but do not borrow tort-specific tolling and revival rules. Accordingly, “[o]nly generally applicable tolling provisions—such as those based on minority, incapacity, and equitable grounds—should be incorporated” in § 1983 and Bivens cases.
Under our approach, the applicable tolling and revival rules never depend on the “precise legal theory of the claim.” There is “no need to analyze the nature of the underlying claims,” because the same state timeliness rules apply to every federal constitutional tort claim—no matter which constitutional right is at issue and no matter which common-law right it resembles. For example, we never ask whether an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is more like trespass or false imprisonment. And we never ask whether an alleged Eighth Amendment violation is more like a sexual assault tort or a medical malpractice tort. A trespass-specific tolling rule or sexual-assault-specific revival rule can never apply, which rules out the need for such inquiries.
We hold that Fisher’s putative Bivens action is time-barred.
There is no Bivens cause of action for failure to prevent inmate-on-inmate assault. And even if Fisher had a cause of action, any Bivens claim would be time-barred by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. New Jersey’s revival provision for sexual assault claims does not apply to a Bivens suit, and Fisher is not entitled to equitable tolling. For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
