Rice Drilling LLC v. Scott, 2024 Pa. Super. LEXIS 380, (Pa. Super., September 04, 2024 (Olson, J.)
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: Appellants, Rice Drilling B, LLC (“Rice”) and EQT Production Company (“EQT”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the July 13, 2023 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that, inter alia, transferred the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County after sustaining preliminary objections filed by Douglas A. Scott and Linda Marie Scott (collectively, “the Scotts”) that asserted, inter alia, improper venue.
For the purpose of examining whether venue in a breach of contract claim is proper, a “‘[t]ransaction or occurrence’ does not include the performance of any act in the contract formation process but[, rather, the term refers to] the ultimate formation of the contract itself.” Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Devore, 267 Pa. Super. 74, 406 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. Super. 1979), citing Craig v. W. J. Thiele & Sons, Inc., 395 Pa. 129, 149 A.2d 35, 37 (Pa. 1959); see also Lucas Enter., Inc. v. Paul C. Harman Co., Inc., 273 Pa. Super. 422, 417 A.2d 720, 721 (Pa. Super. 1980) (stating, “[t]he making of a contract, which takes place where the offer is accepted, undoubtedly constitutes a ‘transaction or occurrence’ sufficient to establish venue”); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(a)(3) (stating, venue is proper where “a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose”). In a breach of [*10] contract action, venue is established in the county where the operative transaction or occurrence (i.e., the formation of the contract) occurred. The performance of ancillary aspects of the formation process will not establish venue. Deyarmin v. Consol. Rail Corp., 2007 PA Super 218, 931 A.2d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 706, 948 A.2d 805 (Pa. 2008); see also Harris v. Brill, 2004 PA Super 24, 844 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa. Super. 2004). Otherwise, permitting a suit to be commenced in any county “where any facet of a complex transaction occurred,” would 2024 Pa. Super. LEXIS 380, *7 Page 4 of 14 “only lead to confusion and forum shopping[.]” Harris, 844 A.2d at 571. Venue is also proper where “the cause of action arose[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(a)(2). “In a contract case, a cause of action accrues when there is an existing right to sue forthwith on the breach of contract.” Kessock v. Conestoga Title Insur. Co., 2018 PA Super 226, 194 A.3d 1046, 1056 (Pa. Super. 2018) (original quotation marks omitted), citing Leedom v. Spano, 436 Pa. Super. 18, 647 A.2d 221, 226 (Pa. Super. 1994). Venue is, therefore, proper where a breach of the contract occurred. Lucas, 417 A.2d at 721-722.
Based upon the allegations contained in Appellants’ amended complaint filed in February 2023, the Scotts agreed in the Settlement Agreement and Coal Owner Permission to Drill Letter to permit Appellants to drill 14 wells on their property. Appellants assert that the Scotts breached their contractual commitments when they filed objections with the DEP concerning Appellants’ well permit applications. The Scotts’ objections to the well permit applications were raised in letters received by the DEP at its Southwest Regional Office in Allegheny County. As such, a breach of contract action accrued and Appellants’ right to sue the Scotts emerged when the DEP received the Scotts’ objection letters at its offices in Allegheny County. Because the alleged breach of contract cause of action arose in Allegheny County, venue is also proper in Allegheny County. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(a)(2); see also Kessock, 194 A.3d at 1056; Lucas, 417 A.2d at 721-722.
The DEP’s delay in ultimately issuing the well permits was due to the Scotts’ objections, which were premised, in part, on the Scotts’ contention that their 2021 lawsuit against Appellants needed to be resolved before issuance of the well permits. According to Appellants’ amended complaint, the delay in the issuance of the well permits and the steps that Appellant had to undertake in order to ultimately obtain well permits caused harm to Appellants. The potential harm to Appellants, therefore, occurred in Allegheny County where the DEP offices are located and where the DEP, based upon receipt of the Scotts’ objection letters and email correspondence, delayed its review and decision surrounding Appellants’ well permit applications. As such, Appellants’ cause of action arose in Allegheny County. Moreover, the Scotts’ actions — including the dissemination of an objection letter and email correspondence referencing the 2021 litigation against Appellants — occurred in Allegheny County because Allegheny County was where the DEP received, 2024 Pa. Super. LEXIS 380, Page 14 of 14 reviewed, and considered the objecting correspondence as part of the well permit application process. As such, a transaction or occurrence giving rise to Appellants cause of action for abuse of process – the sending of an objection letter and emails referencing the 2021 litigation against Appellants — occurred in Allegheny County. Therefore, Allegheny County was one of the venues in which the abuse of process cause of actions could have been filed.
For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the trial court erred as a matter of law in sustaining the Scotts’ preliminary objection asserting improper venue and transferring this case to Greene County. Specifically, we conclude that venue in Allegheny County was proper on Appellants’ breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and abuse of process claims. Consequently, we vacate the July 13, 2023 order that sustained the Scotts’ preliminary objection regarding improper venue and transferred the case sub judice to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County. Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
