CONTRACTS-UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE TUITION

Hickey v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20959, 2023 WL 5159578 (3d Cir. August 11, 2023) (Krause, C.J.) Like many colleges and universities across the country, the University of Pittsburgh and Temple University responded to the novel coronavirus pandemic by transitioning to remote learning in March 2020. Their former students—now Appellants in this consolidated class-action appeal—do not challenge the wisdom of those decisions. But they do seek partial refunds of tuition and fees on the grounds that they received a materially different educational experience than they were promised and that they were denied access to on-campus facilities and services for which they paid specific fees. Both District Courts in the underlying cases granted the Universities’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Pennsylvania has not jettisoned ordinary contract principles permitting implied contracts in cases where, as here, students allege that a university failed to perform a specific undertaking. The question remains whether the Students here have adequately alleged that the Universities breached an implied contract to provide in-person education and services in exchange for (1) tuition, and (2) mandatory fees. Not every benefit touted by a university gives rise to a contractual commitment. The specifics of course work—like instructors, class offerings, room assignments, and degree requirements—are well within universities’ discretion and may be changed consistent with their contractual obligations. Though well understood given the nature of the services universities provide, many universities even make this explicit in reservation of rights provisions. See, e.g., Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 713 F.2d 881, 885 (1st Cir. 1983) (“The University reserves the right to revise or change rules, charges, fees, schedules, courses, requirements for degrees and any other regulations affecting students whenever considered necessary or desirable.”). So, too, must Students anticipate adjustments in campus life: buildings undergo construction, programs face budget cuts, and previously “undefeated” sports teams falter. See Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Not every dispute between a student and a university is amenable to a breach of contract claim[.]”). Even a university’s ratings, rankings, and reputation are expected to fluctuate with normal competition in the marketplace. See United States v. Porat, No. 22-1560, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20278, 2023 WL 5009238, at *6 (3d Cir. 2023). Absent, for example, deceit, those changes would hardly give rise to contractual liability. Nothing in our opinion today attaches new legal significance to these realities. Our holding, rather, is a narrow one: that at the pleading stage, the Complaints’ allegations of frequent references to in-person instruction in university publications, the schools’ tradition of in-person instruction, and their different marketing and price structure for online programming support a reasonable inference that the parties impliedly contracted for in-person education, and that is sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract. We will affirm the dismissal of the Pitt Students’ housing and dining fee claims. See Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2015) (“In the context of a class action, Article III must be satisfied by at least one named plaintiff.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2009) (standing analysis must be tailored to the “type of relief sought”) (citation omitted). The Students have adequately alleged that the services and access to campus facilities that the individual fees were intended to cover were at least partially terminated, so the Students may be owed a refund. See Jones, 51 F.4th at 114 (“Students plausibly allege that they paid for services that Tulane failed to provide and that [they] may be entitled to a partial refund.”). In sum, the Students have adequately pleaded their implied contract claims as to tuition in exchange for in-person education, Pitt’s mandatory fees, and Temple’s University Services fee—but not as to Pitt’s housing and dining fees. Here, the Students have adequately pleaded damages. Not only do they allege that they did not receive the type of education that they purportedly bargained for, which costs more and comes with different benefits than online learning, including “the opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, and critique,” for which they paid; they also allege that they did not receive specific university services while the campuses were shut down. We join the D.C. Circuit in holding that such allegations, if proven, would give rise to “cognizable damages.” Shaffer, 27 F.4th at 765. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the dismissal of the Pitt Students’ housing and dining fee claims, reverse the dismissal of all other claims, and remand for further proceedings.