Harrow v. DOD, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2171 (S. Ct. May 16, 2024) (Kagan, J.).
A federal employee subjected to an adverse personnel action may complain to the Merit Systems Protection Board. If the Board rules against him, he may appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “within 60 days.” 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(1). The question presented is whether that 60-day limit is “jurisdictional,” and therefore precludes equitable exceptions. We hold that the limit, like most filing deadlines, is not jurisdictional.
This Court will “treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Boechler, 596 U. S., at 203, 142 S. Ct. 1493, 212 L. Ed. 2d 524 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006)). Congress of course need not use “magic words” to convey that such a requirement confines a court’s authority. 596 U. S., at 203, 142 S. Ct. 1493, 212 L. Ed. 2d 524. But our demand for a clear statement erects a “high bar.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 409, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 191 L. Ed. 2d 533. For a procedural rule to surmount it, “traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued [the rule] with jurisdictional consequences.” Id., at 410, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 191 L. Ed. 2d 533.
Under that approach, “most time bars are nonjurisdictional.” Ibid.; see Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 154-155, 133 S. Ct. 817, 184 L. Ed. 2d 627 (2013) (citing cases). That is true whether or not the bar is “framed in mandatory terms.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 410, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 191 L. Ed. 2d 533. Consider a provision closely resembling the one here: A veteran denied benefits by an agency “shall file a notice of appeal with the Court [of Appeals for Veterans Claims] within 120 days.” 38 U. S. C. §7266(a). We viewed the provision as a run-of-the-mill “filing deadline,” seeking “to promote the orderly progress of litigation” rather than to demarcate a court’s power. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 179 L. Ed. 2d 159 (2011). The time bar, we explained, “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court.” Id., at 438, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 179 L. Ed. 2d 159 (alterations omitted). And we made the same point when discussing a statute of limitations whose phrasing was even more “emphatic.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 411, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 191 L. Ed. 2d 533. A “tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred,” that provision pronounced, unless presented “within two years.” 28 U. S. C. §2401(b). Once again, we saw no sign that Congress meant to give the time bar jurisdictional consequence. The provision, we reasoned, “does not define a federal court’s jurisdiction over tort claims generally, address its authority to hear untimely suits, or in any way cabin its usual equitable powers.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 411, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 191 L. Ed. 2d 533. The time limit was “just [a] time limit[ ], nothing more.” Id., at 412, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 191 L. Ed. 2d 533.
No language in the time-bar provision Harrow violated suggests a different result.
Having thus held that §7703(b)(1)’s deadline is non-jurisdictional, we encounter a newly raised back-up argument. Even if non-jurisdictional, the Government urges, the 60-day limit “would still not be subject to equitable tolling.” Brief for United States 42. In making that claim, the Government must contend with another high bar. “Because we do not understand Congress to alter” age-old procedural doctrines lightly, “nonjurisdictional [timing rules] are presumptively subject to equitable tolling.” Boechler, 596 U. S., at 209, 142 S. Ct. 1493, 212 L. Ed. 2d 524; see supra, at 3. The Government says it can rebut that presumption, but we are not the right court to now determine whether that is so. The Government did not broach the issue below; the Federal Circuit did not address it; and it is not included in the question presented. We therefore leave the matter (including any waiver issues involved) to the Federal Circuit on remand. And if that court finds equitable tolling available, it should decide whether, on the facts here, Harrow is entitled to that relief.
For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
