ABSTENTION-CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION

Williams v. Krasner, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 13689, 2023 WL 3773861 (3d Cir. June 2, 2023). we agree with Williams that, to the extent he lodged a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA and Rule 902(E)(1), his claim is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532-33, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011) (holding that although a state court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts, a statute or rule governing that decision may be challenged in an independent federal action). Specifically, we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine poses no impediment to his independent claim that Rule of Criminal Procedure 902(E)(1), as authoritatively construed by the Pennsylvania courts in concert with § 9545(d)(2) of the PCRA, violated his due process rights by prohibiting discovery of material to support his otherwise untimely PCRA petition. See Williams, 225 A.3d 1156, 2019 WL 6825169 at *3; see also Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 573 (Pa. 2021) (“[A] PCRA court does not abuse its discretion in failing to find exceptional circumstances warranting discovery in furtherance of an untimely petition.”). Accordingly, to the extent that Williams lodged a facial challenge, like the plaintiff in Skinner, to the constitutionality of the PCRA and Rule 902(E)(1), that claim is not barred. But, to the extent that he claims that the statutes are unconstitutional specifically as applied to his case, that claim is barred. Second, the District Court erred in sua sponte dismissing Williams’s complaint as untimely. “The running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by a mix of federal and state law: The law of the state where the cause of action arose provides the length of the limitations period and tolling principles. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007) (“[In § 1983 suits, w]e have generally referred to state law for tolling rules, just as we have for the length of statutes of limitations.” (citations omitted)); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634, 639 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is governed by the personal injury tort law of the state where the cause of action arose.”). The applicable statute of limitations in Pennsylvania is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524; Wisniewski, 857 F.3d at 157. But federal law determines when a claim accrues and the limitations period begins to run, which is “when the last act needed to complete the tort occurs.” See Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018). A procedural due process violation “is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)). If there is a process that apparently provides adequate procedural remedies, a plaintiff must avail himself of that process before bringing a procedural due process claim. See id.; see also Dist. Att’y’s Off. for Th ird Jud. Dist. v. Osbo rne, 557 U.S. 52, 71, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 174 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2009) (explaining that a plaintiff’s “burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of the state-law procedures available to him in state postconviction relief” is not a requirement to “exhaust state-law remedies”). For these reasons, the District Court erred in dismissing Williams’s complaint sua sponte based on the statute of limitations. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in part, vacate in part, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no view on the merits of Williams’s claims.